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Abstract
Seeing an object on one occasion may facilitate or prime processing of the same object if it is later again encountered. Such
priming may also be found — but at a reduced level — for different but perceptually similar objects that are alternative
exemplars or ‘tokens’ of the initially presented object. We explored the neural correlates of this perceptual speciﬁcity using
event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) procedures, contrasting neural activity when participants made
object classiﬁcation decisions (size judgments) regarding previously presented objects (repeated same), alternative exemplars of
previously presented objects (repeated different), or entirely new objects (novel). Many frontal regions (including bilateral frontal
operculum, bilateral posterior inferior frontal:precentral, left anterior inferior frontal, and superior frontal cortices) and multiple
late visual and posterior regions (including middle occipital, fusiform, fusiform-parahippocampal, precuneus, and posterior
cingulate, all bilaterally), demonstrated reduced neural activity for repeated compared to novel objects. Greater repetition-induced
reductions were observed for same than for different exemplars in several of these regions (bilateral posterior inferior frontal, right
precuneus, bilateral middle occipital, bilateral fusiform, bilateral parahippocampal and bilateral superior parietal). Additionally,
right fusiform (occipitotemporal) cortex showed signiﬁcantly less priming for different versus same exemplars than did left
fusiform. These ﬁndings converge with behavioral evidence from divided visual ﬁeld studies and with neuropsychological evidence
underscoring the key role of right occipitotemporal cortex in processing speciﬁc visual form information; possible differences in
the representational-functional role of left fusiform are discussed. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Human processing of visual forms is characterized by
two broadly complementary abilities. On the one hand,
we can readily notice what is the same across differing
perceptual inputs. Thus, ‘a cup, is a cup, is a cup’
regardless of whether the object before us is a coffee mug,
a tea cup, or a measuring cup. On the other hand, we
can also notice (sometimes with surprising acuity) what
it is that distinguishes one particular object from others
that are, in many respects, very similar. We can differen-
tiate our own cup from someone else’s, our own car from
among many others, and (if possessed of the appropriate
training and interest) a particular type of bird, ﬁsh, or
plant from among numerous other birds, ﬁsh, or plants.
The existence of these two, broadly different, forms of
perceptual and cognitive processing raises several ques-
tions: What cognitive and neural processes support our
ability to extract and use comparatively abstract versus
highly speciﬁc information about visual forms [29,52,49]?
Are different regions of the brain responsible for process-
ing speciﬁc visual form information as opposed to more
abstract types of information [23,32,37]?
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One approach to these questions — particularly with
regard to understanding how differing individual exem-
plars of an object, such as two different umbrellas, may
be processed — is to examine priming effects with an
indirect or implicit measure of memory for previously
encountered objects [19,54]. In a priming experiment,
individuals perform a perceptual or semantic task that
does not require explicit recollection of their initial
experience with an object. Speed or accuracy of re-
sponding to repeated objects, compared to new objects,
is used to draw inferences about the cognitive processes
engaged during the initial experience, and the nature of
the information retained in memory. Results from
priming experiments suggest that speciﬁc visual infor-
mation is sometimes preserved. Studies of visual object
priming, using such tasks as naming and perceptual
identiﬁcation, have found less repetition priming when
a test object is a different exemplar or token of a
previously presented object (e.g. a different umbrella
from that originally presented) than when a test object
is the same exemplar [2–4,12,68]. Other forms of per-
ceptual changes in words and objects have also been
observed to reduce priming [e.g. [24,59]; for review see
[50]].
Several studies have further suggested that sensitivity
to alterations in the precise perceptual form of a stimu-
lus may be inﬂuenced by the laterality of stimulus
presentation. Using a ‘divided visual ﬁeld’ paradigm in
which stimuli were initially presented centrally but then,
at test, were brieﬂy presented either to the left or right
visual ﬁeld, Marsolek and colleagues [36,37,39] reported
greater decrements in priming when perceptually al-
tered stimuli were presented directly to the right than to
the left cerebral hemisphere. This outcome, found for
words, pseudo-words, word-like forms, and line draw-
ings of common objects [35], implies that the right
cerebral hemisphere may retain more speciﬁc visual
form information than the left, which may store rela-
tively more abstract forms or lexical-semantic represen-
tations. Neuropsychological evidence from patients
with damage to occipitotemporal cortex leading to an
impaired ability to recognize faces (prosopagnosia) is
also consistent with the notion that areas of right
occipitotemporal cortex may be particularly sensitive to
alterations in exemplar form. In a number of cases,
damage to these regions also impaired within-category
or item-speciﬁc visual object recognition, with such
item-speciﬁc impairments particularly (although not ex-
clusively) found for lesions in the right hemisphere
[7,17,18,23,69]. The work of Gabrieli and colleagues
[21,62], demonstrating impaired visual form speciﬁc
priming for words in a patient with right occipital
resection (performed as treatment for intractable
epilepsy, and including Brodmann areas 17 and 18 and
a part of area 19) also points to the possible role of the
right hemisphere in contributing to visual form speciﬁc
priming. In particular, Vaidya et al. [62] found that
patient M.S. showed no ‘font-speciﬁc’ priming in a
word-stem completion task (although showing normal
levels of priming for words shown in a different font at
study versus test, unlike the controls, M.S. showed no
beneﬁt from the reinstatement of the same font relative
to a different font).
Recently, several studies have examined the neural
correlates of repetition priming in cognitively intact
humans using positron emission tomography (PET)
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
These studies have shown that the behavioral priming
that results from repeated exposure to a stimulus also is
associated with indications of enhanced ‘neural efﬁ-
ciency’: some of the brain regions initially involved in
the processing of a stimulus show reduced activity
during repeated processing of the stimulus. Reductions
in neural activity for repeated compared to novel stim-
uli have been observed in several regions of left frontal
cortex that are believed to be involved in accessing or
evaluating semantic or phonological representations
(Brodmann areas 47, 45, 44) [10,16,20,44]. Similar re-
ductions have been observed in several posterior corti-
cal regions involved in perceptual or form recognition,
including occipitotemporal and occipital cortices
[[8,9,40,55,58]; for review see [54,70]].
The aim of the present study was to examine the
neuroanatomical correlates of priming in a visual object
classiﬁcation task under conditions where the object
either remained the same across repetitions (e.g. ‘um-
brella A’ on all presentations) or was a different exem-
plar (‘umbrella A’ on the initial presentations, but
‘umbrella B’ on the critical test trial). Although previ-
ous neuroimaging studies of priming have used various
types of stimuli, including words [e.g. [16]] and objects
[9,40,64], in almost all prior studies
1 the repeated stimu-
lus was the same as, or a part of [5,55,58], the initially
exposed stimulus. Thus, these studies do not address
the important question of whether reductions in behav-
ioral priming for different exemplars are accompanied
by similar modulations in neural correlates of priming,
nor do they address whether left and right occipitotem-
poral regions are differentially sensitive to such changes
in the match between the visual form information pro-
cessed during initial and repeated presentations.
Using whole-brain event-related fMRI procedures
that allow examination of regional brain activity associ-
ated with randomly and rapidly intermixed trial types
[14], we compared neural measures of priming for same
1 One exception is Buckner et al. [8] who examined the conse-
quences of changing the letter case of visually presented word-stems
across repeated exposures. Their results, however, could not be used
to make relative comparisons between same and different visual
formats because a same vs. different case manipulation was not
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and different object exemplars. In addition, we focused
on how alterations in the perceptual form of repeated
objects might modulate priming-related reductions in
neural activity in right compared to left occipitotempo-
ral regions. We selected as a particular region of inter-
est an area of fusiform cortex (BA 37:19) that
demonstrated robust repetition-related decreases in ac-
tivity in an earlier object priming study where only
identical objects were repeated [9], and that also
showed increased activation under conditions where
participants made subordinate category judgments re-
garding an object (is this a sparrow?) relative to super-
ordinate judgments (is this a bird?) [22,23]. The latter
effect may possibly reﬂect the additional perceptual
processing required to arrive at a more speciﬁc (within-
category) decision. If right fusiform cortex processes
comparatively more speciﬁc visual form information
about previously encountered objects, then this region
might show less pronounced reductions in neural activ-
ity for different exemplars than does left fusiform
cortex.
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Eighteen individuals (eight female) took part in the
experiment. All were right-handed, native speakers of
English (ages 18–32), with normal or corrected-to-nor-
mal vision, and received $50 for their participation.
2.2. Stimuli
The stimuli were 216 picture pairs (colored line draw-
ings), representing simple objects, obtained from CD-
ROM clip-art collections (e.g. Corel Mega Gallery,
Corel Corporation, 1997). The items in each pair repre-
sented two exemplars or ‘tokens’ of a given object (e.g.
two umbrellas) and were selected to be as different
from one another as possible in shape, color, surface
pattern, and material. Orientation also varied (no ob-
jects were shown in unusual views), but exemplars were
chosen primarily on the basis of features of the object
itself. Although, in a few instances, some of the partici-
pants may have treated the objects within a pair as
differing across levels of categorization (e.g. snake and
constrictor), rather than as two different exemplars at
the same categorization level (both snakes), the objects
in a pair were selected as likely to be designated with
the same name by the majority of participants — while
still attempting to maximize perceptual differences
within each pair. Consistent with this, a normative
behavioral study conducted with 12 participants (eight
female, ages 18–24) from the same population as those
who took part in the imaging study demonstrated that,
on average, within each participant, approx. 91% of the
objects within the object pairs were given either exactly
the same name (mean81%, range76–86%), or a
minor variant of the name (mean10%, range6–
12%; e.g. ﬂower vs. ﬂowers; TV set vs. television set;
pail vs. bucket; wheel vs. tire; errors, involving naming
the object something that was entirely unrelated, or not
naming the object within ﬁve seconds, occurred on 1%
of the trials). Across participants, the objects were
systematically counterbalanced across conditions
(novel, repeated same, repeated different).
2
2.3. Beha6ioral procedure
The experimental session consisted of four alternat-
ing ‘study–test’ cycles, preceded by a brief study–test
practice demonstration. The purpose of the study–test
practice demonstration was twofold: ﬁrst, to ensure
that participants understood and could successfully
complete the task, and second, to pre-familiarize them
with the likely occurrence of, and the nature of, the
repeated items that would be presented during the
experiment, including repeated same, repeated different,
and novel exemplars, thereby minimizing within-session
changes in how participants might perform the task.
A (non-scanned) study phase occurred immediately
prior to each (scanned) test run. In each study phase, a
new subset of 36 objects was presented four times, in a
continuous randomly intermixed sequence, using a new
random order each time. (The objects were presented
repeatedly rather than only once because prior research
[e.g. [9]] demonstrated increased behavioral priming for
repeated same items that were presented multiple times
and we wanted to maximize the likelihood of detecting
any neural differences in priming for the repeated same
and repeated different items.)
2 For counterbalancing purposes, the set of 216 object pairs was
divided into four sets equated for content type (e.g. animals, furni-
ture, etc.); these sets were further divided into three subsets. The sets
were used to counterbalance stimuli across the four runs of the
experiment and subsets were used to counterbalance conditions
within runs (novel, repeated same, repeated different). Additionally,
within each object pair, the objects were pseudo-randomly assigned to
either an odd or an even stimulus number. For the different exemplar
condition, the items shown at study were always the exemplars with
odd numbers; at test, and for all conditions, only even-numbered
exemplars were tested. In this way, all participants were tested with
the identical set of 216 objects but the prior ‘exposure history’ for the
objects was systematically counterbalanced (i.e. earlier preceded by
the odd-numbered pair-member for different items, by the even-num-
bered pair-member for the same items, and by no prior exposure for
novel items). Because the stimuli presented during scanning were held
constant for all participants — only exposure history varied — any
differences between the three key object presentation conditions
(repeated same, repeated different, and new) cannot be attributed to
irrelevant or uncontrolled perceptual differences in the stimuli within
a pair.W. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 187
Fig. 1. Examples of the colored objects used as stimuli in the experiment. Items during study were shown at a rate of one stimulus every two
seconds and were presented four times in a continuous, randomly intermixed, list. Trial types at test included novel objects (items never previously
presented in the experiment), repeated same (items identical to those presented in the immediately prior study phase), repeated different (items that
were alternative exemplars or ‘tokens’ of items presented in the immediately prior study phase) and visual ﬁxation.
Stimuli were presented once every two seconds (0.5 s
stimulus duration; ﬁxation cross-hair displayed between
stimuli). Participants decided if the referent of each
object was or was not larger than a 13 in. square box.
To provide a concrete frame of reference for this judg-
ment, participants were shown an actual 13 in. square
box during the task instructions. They were instructed
to respond quickly and accurately and to maintain
ﬁxation throughout the task.
In the test phase, participants performed the same
object classiﬁcation task, but now during scanning.
Items were presented in randomly intermixed (non-
blocked) order, with test runs comprised of four trial
types: no6el (objects not previously presented), repeated
same (identical to objects repeatedly presented during
the immediately preceding study phase), repeated differ-
ent (‘alternative’ exemplars of objects repeatedly pre-
sented during the immediately preceding study phase),
and ﬁxation (a centrally displayed visual cross-hair). All
objects were presented once only. Fig. 1 presents a
schematic diagram of the procedure.
3
3 For each test, pseudo-random orderings of the four trial types
were created for individual participants, ensuring that each trial type
occurred equally often and that each trial type was approximately
equally likely to be preceded, on the two immediately prior trials, by
all combinations of the other trial types ([11]; see [9] for additional
details). Each of these initial trial orders was used to systematically
counterbalance the ordering of the trial types for a given participant
such that, across the four runs, any one trial position (e.g. the ﬁrst
item of each run) represented each of the four conditions (novel,
repeated same, repeated different, and ﬁxation). In this manner, the
average ‘trial history’ of each trial type was equated, thus allowing for
cancellation of the overlap (‘cross-talk’) of the hemodynamic re-
sponse across trials (see [14]). Each of the ﬁrst 12 participants
received a unique counterbalancing; thereafter, a subset of six of these
12 sets of lists was used for the remaining participants.W. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 188
2.4. fMRI imaging procedure
Imaging was performed with a 3.0 T General Electric
MRI scanner equipped with an echo planar imaging
upgrade (Advanced NMR Systems). Visual images
were back-projected to participants from an Apple
PowerMacintosh computer; participants viewed the im-
ages through a mirror on the head coil. To minimize
artifacts arising from head motion, foam cushioning
was placed snugly around the side and back of the
participant’s head. Participants indicated their re-
sponses to the object classiﬁcation task with their left
(non-dominant) hand using a magnet-compatible key
press.
Conventional structural images that provided de-
tailed anatomic information were ﬁrst acquired (high
resolution rf-spoiled GRASS sequence, 60 slice sagittal,
2.8 mm thickness), followed by functional images sensi-
tive to blood oxygenation level-dependent contrast
(echo planar T2 *-weighted gradient echo sequence,
TR2s ,T E 30 ms, ﬂip90°). Each functional run
consisted of 88 sequential whole-brain acquisitions (16
axial slices aligned to the plane intersecting the anterior
and posterior commissures, 3.125 mm in-plane resolu-
tion, 7 mm thickness, skip 1 mm between slices).
4
The procedures for selective averaging and statistical
map generation are detailed elsewhere [9,14]. Brieﬂy,
data from individual fMRI runs were ﬁrst normalized
to correct for global between-run signal intensity
changes and temporal drift. The normalized data were
then selectively averaged in relation to the beginning of
each trial type. There were ﬁve trial types: novel, re-
peated same, repeated different, ﬁxation, and ‘other’
(trials where no response was given, or the response
occurred in B300 ms).
5 After all trials were selectively
averaged for each subject, the mean and variance im-
ages were transformed into stereotaxic atlas space (in-
terpolated to 3.125 mm isotropic voxels) allowing for
across subject averaging [60,61]. Thereafter, statistical
activation maps were constructed based on the differ-
ences between trial types using a t-statistic [14].
Clusters of ﬁve or more voxels (152.6 mm
3) exceeding
a statistical threshold of pB0.001 were considered sig-
niﬁcant foci of activation. These criteria have been
found to result in the identiﬁcation of few false posi-
tives in control data sets [9,66]. An automated al-
gorithm was used to identify signiﬁcant peaks of
activation; when signiﬁcant peaks occurred within 10
mm of one another, the most signiﬁcant peak was
retained. For a subset of the peak activations that were
obtained in an unbiased comparison of novel trials vs.
all repeated trials, additional region-of-interest (ROI)
analyses were conducted. For these ROIs, analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) — treating subjects as a random
factor — were performed for each ROI separately,
treating object type (novel, repeated same, repeated
different) and time-point (time-point 1 through time-
point 8, corresponding to the eight images acquired
during the 0–16 s peri-stimulus window) as repeated
measures factors; the dependent variable was the per-
cent MRI signal change from the average signal across
all trials, less ﬁxation. Where these initial analyses
showed a signiﬁcant object typetime-point interac-
tion, further analyses were conducted on the peak
(highest amplitude) response, deﬁned using the mean of
all three object types. These included, ﬁrst, one-way
ANOVAs treating object type as a repeated measures
factor, and second (where these one-way analyses
showed signiﬁcant differences), focused pairwise com-
parisons, contrasting each of the conditions against
each other. Finally, a ROI analysis was performed to
test for possible laterality differences in repetition prim-
ing in right and left occipitotemporal (fusiform) cortex
for repeated same vs. repeated different exemplars.
3. Results
3.1. Beha6ioral results
Participants showed a high level of accuracy on the
object classiﬁcation task both during the initial non-
Fig. 2. Mean response latencies for the object classiﬁcation task
across the four repeated presentations of objects during the study
phase (left panel) and for novel, repeated same, and repeated different
objects in the test phase (right panel). Error bars indicate standard
errors of the mean.
4 To provide a stable task baseline, each functional run began and
ended with a 16 s period of visual ﬁxation. Also, at the beginning of
each run, four additional whole-brain images were acquired and
discarded to allow longitudinal magnetization to reach equilibrium.
5 During fMRI analysis, we excluded items where participants gave
no response, or provided a response in B300 ms. Approximately 1%
of the trials were excluded for these reasons. Although the exclusion
of these items slightly altered the counterbalancing for individual
subjects, the number of such trials was few, and examination of the
time-courses (see Fig. 4) suggests that the counterbalancing was
successful (note the close equivalence of the activation levels for each
of the three conditions at the onset of the trial).W. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 189
Table 1
Regions demonstrating greater activation for novel than repeated objects (combining across same and different objects)a
Region Signiﬁcance log (p) Talairach coordinates BA
yz x
L fusiform 40 52 6 22.93 37, 19
31 L frontal operculum 22 9 22.60 45, 47
34 3 31 22.47 L anterior inferior frontal 47, 45
21 L parahippocampal 37 6 21.34 36
28 L parahippocampal 30 9 20.25 36
43 12 31 18.93 R fusiform:parahippocampal 37, 36
6 Superior frontal 16 46 17.90 6, 8
58 6 46 17.45 R fusiform 37, 19
31 L fusiform:parahippocampal 43 15 15.21 37, 36
25 L precuneus 68 31 15.10 31, 19
19 6 34 14.87 R frontal operculum 45, 47
74 18 R middle occipital:middle temporal 14.24 46 19, 39
80 9 31 14.20 L middle occipital 19
31 L middle occipital 80 25 13.34 19
43 L posterior inferior frontal:precentral 6 25 12.86 44, 6
32 8 37 12.76 L posterior inferior frontal:precentral 44, 6
R middle occipital 74 34 15 12.59 19
52 15 9 11.31 L posterior cingulate 30, 23
25 R superior parietal 52 46 10.69 7
40 R posterior inferior frontal 9 31 10.13 44
68 9 34 9.80 R middle occipital:fusiform 19
49 6 R posterior cingulate 9.66 12 29, 30
68 9 18 9.64 R fusiform 19
28 R cerebellum 62 15 9.43 –
46 R posterior inferior frontal 9 21 9.10 44
55 12 21 8.78 R precuneus 31, 23
68 28 8.29 R precuneus 31, 19 28
68 18 43 8.22 L middle temporal:inferior parietal 39
L lingual 93 15 3 8.07 17, 18
a Coordinates are listed from the Talairach and Tournoux atlas [60]; R, right; L, left; BA, approximate Brodmann area based on atlas
coordinates.
scanned study phase (86.2%) and during the fMRI test
phase (novel83.3%, repeated same87.6%, repeated
different88.2%). Classiﬁcation judgments for novel
items were signiﬁcantly less accurate than for repeated
same, F(1,17)10.44, MSE0.002, P0.005, or re-
peated different, F(1,17)10.39, MSE0.002, P
0.005, exemplars.
Classiﬁcation response times during the initial study
phase decreased across the four repeated presentations
of an object (Fig. 2), showing substantial response
facilitation or priming, F(3,51)83.72, MSE959.14,
PB0.0001. This priming effect carried over into the
scanned test phase, with both repeated same (mean
RT701 ms) and repeated different (769 ms) items
classiﬁed more quickly than novel items (835 ms), F(1,
17)98.52, MSE1643.72, PB0.0001 and F(1,17)
48.33, MSE823.69, PB0.0001, respectively. Criti-
cally, priming was also inﬂuenced by the degree of
perceptual similarity of the repeated items: classiﬁcation
responses were reliably faster for repeated same than
for repeated different exemplars, F(1,17)46.11,
MSE892.90, PB0.0001. Additionally, examination
of the pattern of behavioral priming separately for each
of the four study–test runs indicated that participants
showed a similar pattern of priming performance across
the entire scanning session, with each of the four runs
yielding both signiﬁcant priming and a signiﬁcant spe-
ciﬁcity effect (for repeated different\repeated same,
smallest F(1,17)22.66, MSE936.51, PB0.0002),
and no overall effect of run on the magnitude of the
speciﬁcity effect, F(3,51)B1.9. These outcomes suggest
that participants continued to perform the task in a
similar manner throughout the scanning session.
3.2. Imaging results
3.2.1. No6el\repeated comparisons
We ﬁrst considered brain regions that showed greater
activity for novel items than for All repeated items
(combining across repeated same and repeated differ-
ent). As shown in Table 1 and Fig. 3, greater activation
for novel than all repeated items was observed in
multiple bilateral late visual and posterior regions, in-
cluding middle occipital, fusiform, fusiform:W. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 190
Fig. 3.
parahippocampal, precuneus, and posterior cingulate.
Several frontal regions were also more active for novel
than all repeated items, including bilateral frontal oper-
culum, bilateral posterior inferior frontal:precentral,
left anterior inferior frontal, and superior frontal cor-
tices. Within the cerebellum, a right-lateralized regionW. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 191
also showed a signiﬁcant effect of repetition. Several of
these regions were also found to be more active for
novel than for repeatedly presented items in separate
comparisons of novel vs. repeated same and novel vs.
repeated different.
6
Direct comparison of the repeated different vs. re-
peated same conditions (see Table 2) showed greater
activation (indicating less pronounced priming) for re-
peated different than repeated same items in several
regions (see Fig. 3), including right precuneus and
bilateral posterior inferior frontal, middle occipital,
fusiform, parahippocampal (medial to L and M in Fig.
3) and superior parietal (not shown).
Examination of the time-courses of percent signal
change for a subset of the regions that showed signiﬁ-
cant activation in the novel vs. all repeated comparison
(particularly including frontal and occipitotemporal ar-
eas that were previously implicated in priming), showed
that the level of activation typically reached peak am-
plitude four to six seconds following stimulus onset and
returned to baseline by 14 s. Representative time-
courses are shown in Fig. 4 for peak activations in left
and right posterior inferior frontal (BA 44, 6, shown as
A, B in Fig. 3) and left and right fusiform cortex (BA
37, 19, shown as L, M in Fig. 3).
Analyses of variance performed on the peak ampli-
tude response revealed that 4 out of 18 selected regions
of interest (ROIs) did not show signiﬁcant reductions
for repeated different compared to novel items; these
regions (i.e. brain foci that showed either a high level of
perceptual speciﬁcity, or little ‘abstract’ visual priming,
with no signiﬁcant beneﬁt achieved through prior expo-
sure to a different exemplar of the object) were right
fusiform (M in Fig. 3), left and right precuneus (C and
D in Fig. 3), and right posterior inferior frontal cortex
(cf. A and B in Fig. 3)
7.
A region-of-interest analysis focusing on possible lat-
erality differences in repetition priming for same vs.
different exemplars in occipitotemporal cortex (right
and left fusiform, Talairach coordinates of 46, 58,
6 and 40, 52, 6, respectively) showed that
there was a signiﬁcantly greater effect of exemplar
change in right than left fusiform cortex, F(1,17)
7.78, MSE0.001, P0.01 for the regionitem type
interaction. Although both regions showed less priming
for repeated different than for repeated same exem-
plars, the modulation as a result of altered perceptual
form was greater for right than left fusiform cortex (see
Fig. 3, and time-course in Fig. 4).
3.2.2. Repeated\no6el comparisons
In addition to exploring the speciﬁcity of the neu-
roanatomical correlates of repetition priming, the cur-
rent design also allows exploration of a somewhat
different question: Do any brain regions show system-
atically greater activation for previously encountered
objects than for novel items? Although the object clas-
siﬁcation task that participants performed did not
7 This ﬁnding of no signiﬁcant activation difference for novel
objects compared with different object exemplars in right posterior
inferior frontal cortex (BA 44) is broadly consistent with neuropsy-
chological evidence and recent fMRI ﬁndings [see [30,63,65]] demon-
strating material speciﬁcity effects in left vs. right prefrontal regions,
such that right prefrontal areas are particularly recruited for the
processing of nonverbal materials and left prefrontal areas for verbal
materials. Indeed, to the extent that right prefrontal regions may also
have been more sensitive to alterations in the precise perceptual form
of objects than left prefrontal regions, an interaction of object type
(same:different) and hemisphere (right:left) might have been ex-
pected. This was, in fact, a second planned interaction that we tested
(Talairach coordinates of 37, 3, 28 and 40, 9, 31 for left and right,
respectively); however, this interaction was not signiﬁcant, FB1. (As
with any null result, this ﬁnding should be interpreted cautiously.)
6 A complete listing of peak coordinates is available from the ﬁrst
author.
Fig. 3. Composite functional activation maps showing differences in brain activity for each of four comparisons: (1) novel\all repeated
(combining across repeated same and repeated different), (2) novel\repeated same, (3) novel\repeated different, (4) repeated different\re-
peated same. Images are axial (horizontal) sections based on the averaged functional and anatomical data of 18 participants. The left side of each
image corresponds to the left side of the brain. All regions shown passed the statistical threshold for signiﬁcance. Coordinates on the
inferior–superior (z) axis from the stereotaxic atlas of Talairach and Tournoux [60] are shown at the bottom of the ﬁgure. In the comparison of
novel\all repeated, greater activation for novel than previously presented objects (reﬂecting priming) can be seen in several frontal and posterior
and visual areas, including left and right posterior inferior frontal cortex (BA 44, 6, labeled A and B); left and right precuneus (BA 31, 19, labeled
C and D); left and right frontal operculum (BA 45, 47, labeled E and F); left and right middle occipital (BA 19, labeled G and H); left and right
posterior cingulate (BA 29, 30, labeled I and J); left anterior inferior frontal (BA 47, 45, labeled K) and left and right fusiform, extending into
parahippocampal cortex (BA 37, 19, labeled L and M). Very similar regions are apparent in the separate comparison of novel\repeated same.
By contrast, a number of these regions were not signiﬁcant in the novel\repeated different comparison, including bilateral posterior inferior
frontal (BA 44:6), bilateral precuneus (BA 31, 19), bilateral middle occipital (BA 19), and right fusiform (BA 37, 19). Particularly pronounced
modulation by exemplar change can be seen in bilateral fusiform gyrus, especially the contrasting pattern of priming-related reductions in left (but
not right) fusiform for novel\different (Panel 3) as opposed to greater activation in right fusiform in the comparison of different\same (Panel
4).W. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 192
Table 2
Regions demonstrating greater activation for repeated different than repeated same objectsa
Talairach coordinates BA Signiﬁcance log (p) Region
z xy
3 19.41 37, 19 R fusiform 43 55
19 15.82 R middle occipital 12 37 80
31 15.35 R precuneus 31, 19 28 65
13.33 R parahippocampal 28 37 9 36, 35
12.48 44 R posterior inferior frontal 31 46 6
11.95 L posterior inferior frontal:precentral 37 6 31 44, 6
7 11.13 R superior parietal 40 28 52
9 11.13 36, 35 L parahippocampal 28 40
37, 19 10.39 L fusiform 6 40 49
19 L middle occipital 31 83 12 9.78
9.22 R posterior inferior frontal 34 6 31 44, 6
8.79 19 L middle occipital 21 28 77
7 L superior parietal 25 55 46 7.75
a Coordinates are listed from the Talairach and Tournoux atlas [60]; R, right; L, left; BA, approximate Brodmann area based on atlas
coordinates.
require explicit recollection of the previously presented
items (participants were simply asked to repeatedly
judge the size of the referents of the pictured objects),
processing of the repeated items might nonetheless yield
greater activation than for novel items either because:
(a) repeated items might prompt recall of the item’s
earlier presentation, with such recall possibly occurring
intentionally, but also possibly reﬂecting ‘incidental’ or
‘involuntary’ remembering in the absence of an explicit
intention to retrieve or of any deliberate search [cf.
[1,46,47,53,56]] or (b) some brain regions might show
greater activation for ‘old’ than ‘new’ items, even
though this ‘old:new’ effect is not correlated with re-
membering per se. In either case, activation in brain
regions that have been found to be involved in memory
retrieval (e.g., recognition or recall) or that show ‘old\
new’ effects might be expected.
To explore this secondary question, we also per-
formed analyses that examined whether activation was
greater for all repeated objects than for novel objects.
Several parietal, cingulate, and temporal activations
were found in this comparison (see Table 3), and also in
a separate comparison of repeated same\novel. How-
ever, in the latter comparison, several further foci were
observed that were not apparent for all repeated\
novel, including right and left frontal activations, par-
ticularly in middle frontal regions (BA 10, BA 9, BA 8,
8:6); bilateral superior temporal activations (BA 42,
42:22) were also seen. Direct comparison of the re-
peated same and repeated different items showed many
similar activations; Table 4 lists activations in frontal
regions that emerged in this comparison.
8
ROIs were examined, including bilateral parietal re-
gions showing an all repeated\novel pattern, bilateral
parietal, frontal, and left superior temporal regions
showing a repeated same\novel pattern, and several
frontal regions showing a repeated same\repeated
different pattern. In the parietal regions, the time-
courses demonstrated signal reductions such that the
activation level for the object trials fell below the
ﬁxation baseline, with the repeated same items showing
more modest reductions relative to the repeated differ-
ent or novel items. By contrast, several of the frontal
regions showed an actual ‘activation increase’ for the
repeated same items. For the repeated same\novel
comparison, these included bilateral middle frontal cor-
tex (BA 10: 25, 53, 15 and 25, 56, 18; also BA 46:9:
21, 44, 31), and a more posterior region, near middle
frontal gyrus (BA 6 and BA 8: 37, 6, 53 and 40, 16, 46).
Left superior temporal cortex (56, 15, 6) likewise
showed an activation increase. For the repeated
same\repeated different comparison, a left middle
frontal region (BA 10: 25, 59, 15), and a region in
cuneus:superior occipital cortex (BA 19: 3, 80,
34), showed activation increases.
Random effects analyses on the eight ROIs that
showed an actual activation increase for the repeated
same items relative to the novel or repeated different
items revealed, in each instance, a signiﬁcant effect of
item type (smallest F(2, 34)4.48), and signiﬁcantly
greater activation for repeated same than novel, and for
repeated same than repeated different. By contrast, for
six of these regions, repeated different and novel items
showed no reliable difference in amplitude of activation
(and one region showed signiﬁcantly less activation for
repeated different than for novel).
Although it is not possible to determine whether
these greater activations for repeated items than for
8 Complete listings of these activations, and those for the repeated
same\novel comparison, are available from the ﬁrst author upon
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Fig. 4. Percent fMRI signal change (relative to the visual ﬁxation baseline) for novel, repeated same, and repeated different objects in left and right
posterior inferior frontal cortex (BA 44, 6, peak ROI coordinates of 37, 3, 28 and 40, 9, 31, respectively), and for left and right fusiform cortex
(BA 37, 19; peak ROI coordinates of 40, 52, 6 and 46, 58, 6, respectively), shown in the upper and lower panel respectively. The
interaction between laterality and perceptual similarity across repetitions was signiﬁcant for the regions of fusiform gyrus.
novel items reﬂect intentional or incidental recollection,
or old\new effects unrelated to memory per se, here it
might brieﬂy be noted — especially as an observation
for future studies — that three regions, in particular,
appear to nearly match activations that have been
previously reported in recognition memory paradigms.
One of these regions demonstrated a reduction (fol-
lowed by an increase) relative to the ﬁxation baseline:
1. Inferior parietal (BA 40, all repeated\novel: 40,
58, 40). Here observed bilaterally, activation in
this region was reported particularly on the left in a
comparison of hits vs. correct rejections by Konishi
et al. [31] (39, 55, 36; also 33, 53, 44), and in
a comparison of correct ‘remember’ responses rela-
tive to correct ‘new’ responses by Henson et al. [28]
(superior parietal: 33, 60, 45). Also, in a quan-
titative meta-analysis of ﬁve PET studies examining
recognition memory, Habib and Lepage [25] re-
ported a similar region (36, 58, 32) as showing
‘familiarity activations’, that is, greater activationW. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 194
Table 3
Regions demonstrating greater activation for repeated than novel objects (combining across same and different objects)a
Signiﬁcance log (p) Region BA Talairach coordinates
yz x
62 37 R inferior parietal 30.00 43 39, 40
Precuneus 6 62 40 26.92 7
Posterior cingulate 21 0 34 15.29 23
58 40 40 13.36 L inferior parietal 40
46 R inferior parietal 46 31 9.29 40, 39
49 21 R superior temporal 8.66 53 22
65 50 8.52 34 7 L superior parietal
a Coordinates are listed from the Talairach and Tournoux atlas [60]; R, right; L, left; BA, approximate Brodmann area based on atlas
coordinates.
for familiar stimuli, including pictures, words, and
auditory sentences, than for new items.
In addition, two regions manifested actual activation
increases for the repeated same items:
2. Middle frontal gyrus (BA 10, repeated same\re-
peated different: 25, 59, 15). Here observed bilat-
erally, activation in this region was found particularly
on the left in the comparisons of the prior studies
noted above (Konishi et al.: 35, 51, 8; Habib and
Lepage: 40, 44, 20; Henson et al., superior frontal:
12, 63, 18).
3. Medial cuneus:superior occipital (BA 19: 3, 80,
34). Here found in the repeated same\repeated
different comparison, this region is very close to one
reported in the meta-analysis of Habib and Lepage
(BA 19: 6, 76, 32) as demonstrating greater activa-
tion for familiar stimuli than for new items; it is also
close to a region reported by Konishi et al. (7,
73, 34) for hits vs. correct rejections, and Henson
et al. (0, 66, 33) for correct ‘remember’ vs. ‘new’
responses.
4. Discussion
Consistentwithseveralpreviousstudies[e.g.[9,64]],we
found priming-related reductions in neural activity when
participants performed classiﬁcation judgments for pre-
viously presented objects relative to novel objects. Re-
duced neural activity for repeated objects was observed
in multiple frontal regions, including left anterior inferior
frontal (BA 47, 45) and left posterior inferior frontal (BA
44, 6) cortex — possibly reﬂecting increased ease in
accessing and:or working with semantic or phonological
attributes of recently processed items [e.g. [10,16,20,44]]
— as well as right posterior inferior frontal cortex (BA
44) — possibly reﬂecting decreased demands on visuo–
spatial attentional processes required for the size judg-
ment task [e.g. [30,63]] for repeated items.
Priming-related reductions in neural activity were also
seen in multiple posterior and higher-order visual areas,
including bilateral middle occipital (BA 19),
parahippocampal (BA 36:35) and fusiform (BA 37:19)
cortices. These reductions, largely paralleling those
found in a previous fMRI study [9] using a similar
experimental paradigm but including only repeated same
object exemplars may — in part (see further discussion
below) — reﬂect perceptual processing beneﬁts achieved
from repeated processing of the same stimulus. These
priming-related reductions for novel vs. repeated objects,
observed here using fMRI, may also be similar to
reductions in intracranial event-related potentials, re-
cently reported by Puce, Allison, and McCarthy [43] for
repeatedly presented faces. Recording from electrodes
placed directly on the cortical surface of the brain (to
monitor intractable seizures), these researchers found
substantial and progressive decreases in the early portion
of an N700 potential and in a P350 potential at face-spe-
ciﬁcsites,showingincreasinghabituationacrossrepeated
presentations of initially novel faces (the faces were
presented eight times in a blocked, nonintermixed fash-
ion and results were similar for right and left hemisphere
sites). At the neuronal level, these priming-related reduc-
tions may also parallel the phenomenon, observed using
single-unit recordings in non-human primates and vari-
ously designated as ‘repetition suppression’, ‘stimulus-
speciﬁc adaptation’, and ‘adaptive mnemonic ﬁltering’,
demonstrating reduced neuron activity for repeatedly
exposed objects and faces compared with the initial or
novel presentation of those stimuli [e.g. [33,41,48,51]].
Critically, in addition to these overall (novel vs.
repeated) priming effects, we found that the magnitude
of facilitation observed in bilateral middle occipital (BA
19), parahippocampal (BA 36:35) and fusiform (BA
37:19) cortices was modulated by alterations in the
perceptual form of the object. Comparatively more
modest reductions in neural activity were found for
differentexemplarsoftheearlierexposedobjectsthanfor
the same exemplars. Furthermore, a region of occipi-
totemporal (fusiform) cortex showed laterality differ-
ences in sensitivity to alterations in the perceptual formW. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 195
Table 4
Frontal regions demonstrating greater activation for repeated same than for repeated different exemplarsa
Region Talairach coordinates BA Signiﬁcance log (p)
xy z
L middle frontal 25 59 15 17.39 10
13.83 R middle frontal 10 28 56 15
10 11.31 Medial frontal 6 53 6
10.17 46 8 19 21 R middle frontal
18 9 9.67 31 47 L middle frontal
9.13 40 31 L middle frontal 25 8
21 22 8 40 9.02 L middle frontal
28 R middle frontal 8, 9 34 8.59 37
Superior frontal 6 8.52 59 15 3
6, 8 8.51 37 43 R middle frontal 9
9 12 R superior frontal 71 7.91 6
a Coordinates are listed from the Talairach and Tournoux atlas [60]; R, right; L, left; BA, approximate Brodmann area based on atlas
coordinates.
of repeated objects. Speciﬁcally, visual form changes
were associated with a larger ‘cost’ to the neural beneﬁts
achieved through prior experience in right (Talairach
coordinatesof46, 58, 6)relativetoleft(40, 52,
6) fusiform cortex. This latter ﬁnding is broadly
consistent with behavioral ﬁndings from divided visual
ﬁeld studies that have shown greater decrements in
repetition priming for perceptually altered stimuli pre-
sented directly to the right than to the left cerebral
hemisphere
9, and with neuropsychological evidence from
prosopagnosic patients, suggesting a possible differential
involvement of right occipitotemporal cortices in allow-
ing discrimination of categorically related objects. The
absence of font-speciﬁc priming reported by Vaidya et al.
[62] in patient M.S. following surgical resection of right
occipital cortex is likewise broadly consistent with this
ﬁnding. (Also see Davidoff and Warrington [15], for a
patient with a predominantly right hemisphere temporo-
parieto-occipital lesion who showed extremely impaired
object recognition for objects presented in nonconven-
tional but not conventional views, and who was largely
unable to detect alterations in color, shape, or parts of
objects that he could, nevertheless, correctly name.)
The region of left fusiform gyrus (Talairach coordi-
nates of 40, 52, 6) that showed less sensitivity to
the perceptual change between different and same exem-
plars(asindexedbylessofareductioninpriming)isclose
to a region that has shown greater activation during the
encoding of visually presented words that were subse-
quently remembered relative to those that were subse-
quently forgotten (coordinates of 43, 55, 9) [66],
suggesting that activation in this region is not speciﬁc to
visual object forms. Moreover, we have also recently
observed repetition-related reductions in left fusiform
activity using a word generation task in which partici-
pants were asked to covertly generate words (e.g. partic-
ipant encounters ‘COU––’ and generates ‘courage’) in
response to visually (coordinates of 50, 58, 12)
or auditorily presented (coordinates of 43, 52,
12) ‘word stems’ [[10]; see also [1]].
In view of these latter outcomes, it might be necessary
to revise earlier interpretations of priming-related reduc-
tions in this region that attributed facilitation to en-
hanced visual perceptual processing [54,70]. Rather,
because similar reductions in this region were observed
for visual word stems and auditory word-stems where no
visual form was presented, the reductions might reﬂect
facilitation of non-6isual processing involved in the word-
generation task. Evidence congruent with this interpreta-
tion includes other reports of activation in this region
during auditory presentation of words [67] and ﬁndings
from presurgical explorations in epileptic patients [34]
suggesting that this region — possibly close to, or
overlapping with, a region that has been termed the
‘basal temporal language area’ — may assume an
important role in linking meaning with words [67], or in
9 One, apparently inconsistent, observation between the present
ﬁndings and those obtained using the divided visual ﬁeld paradigm
concerns the exact stimulus presentation parameters under which
speciﬁcity may be observed. Whereas in the present study we ob-
served hemispheric differences in speciﬁc (or abstract) priming using
a 500-ms exposure of the objects at study and at test, Marsolek [35],
using line-drawings of common objects in a divided visual ﬁeld
procedure, failed to ﬁnd such a speciﬁcity difference for a 500-ms
exposure but did ﬁnd a speciﬁcity difference using a longer exposure
time (three seconds). There are numerous methodological differences
between the behavioral divided visual ﬁeld paradigm and the current
study that might contribute to this differing pattern [e.g. the stimuli in
the present experiment were detailed colored objects and repeated
items were presented multiple times before the critical test trial, but
participants performed the same orienting task (size judgments) for
the objects on each presentation; in contrast, the stimuli in the
divided visual ﬁeld study were black and white line drawings, partic-
ipants performed a different task during the initial exposure than
during the test trial (one of three different orienting tasks vs. confron-
tation naming on the test trial), and objects at test were presented
either to the right or left visual ﬁeld for only 17 ms each.]W. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 196
naming or tagging stimuli that are recognizable [[6]; also
see [45]]. Consistent with this possibility, recent PET
evidence [42] indicates that patients with semantic de-
mentia, who show especially pronounced difﬁculties in
naming, demonstrate less activation in this region (coor-
dinates of 54, 52, 10) than do normal controls
during semantic comparison tasks involving both pic-
tures and words.
On this interpretation, although the object classiﬁca-
tion task used in the present experiment did not require
generating the names of the pictured objects, some lexical
processing may have occurred. Activation of left inferior
frontal gyrus, consistently found during tasks involving
lexical:semantic elaboration, is congruent with this pos-
sibility. If the ‘mapping’ of lexical, conceptual, or phono-
logical information to the objects was relatively similar
for the two exemplars of an object pair, then greater
transfer (facilitation) would be expected across object
exemplars for this information (shown in relatively
preserved ‘neural priming’ in left fusiform cortex for
different exemplars) than for visual form information,
which was deliberately varied across exemplars (shown
in more marked reductions in neural priming in right
fusiform). Evidence of some (albeit less marked) modu-
lation in priming for different — compared to same —
exemplar objects in left fusiform might have arisen if the
exemplars emphasized somewhat different conceptual or
semantic features of the objects, and thus affected the
mapping between pictorial form and lexical:phonologi-
cal information, or led to differences in how the objects
within an exemplar pair were named. [Note that the
normative behavioral data are also consistent with this
account, with participants who were asked to directly
name the objects providing ‘non-identical’ names for the
two exemplars within a pair for a total of about 18% of
the items — 10% comprising minor variants such as
ﬂower vs. ﬂowers; bunny vs. bunny rabbit; gift vs. gift
box; and 8% comprising different levels of classiﬁcation,
such as bird vs. parrot; cookies vs. oreos, but with
variations of both types tending to emerge for different
items for different individuals.]
Alternative accounts of the differential modulation of
the right and left occipitotemporal regions, as a function
of perceptual speciﬁcity, are also possible. The left
fusiform might also be partially sensitive to perceptual
form, but relatively less so than right fusiform, or it may
operate at a more ‘abstract’ level of visual form. This
latter proposal may be closer to that forwarded by
Marsolek [35] to account for differential effects of
perceptual speciﬁcity in divided visual-ﬁeld studies. Mar-
solek [35] has speciﬁcally argued that the dissociable
subsystem underlying abstract–category object recogni-
tion in left posterior regions is a 6isual subsystem — ‘one
that processes only visual-structure information’ (p. 111)
— rather than arising from the similar treatment of
different exemplars in post-visual phonological or con-
ceptual subsystems (though such post-visual subsystems
may provide the feedback that then allows the visual
subsystem to map abstract visual inputs to the same
name or output representation). Marsolek ([35]; see also
[38]) has suggested that greater sensitivity to alterations
of perceptual form in the right hemisphere may reﬂect a
relatively more holistically-based visual processing strat-
egy (with features not represented independently in the
subsystem) whereas left hemisphere processing may be
relatively more feature-based (with the different features
of inputs represented separately in the subsystem,
thereby allowing classiﬁcation on the basis of subsets of
similar features).
On the one hand, the outcomes of the present exper-
iment appear entirely consistent with Marsolek’s pro-
posal. On the other hand, at least for the particular
regions of fusiform cortex that here demonstrated differ-
ential modulation as a function of exemplar type, an
account strictly focusing on visual object forms does not
appear to adequately explain the priming-related reduc-
tions that we found in a very similar region of left
fusiform during processing of words and also auditory
word-stems, where no visual form information was
presented, nor would it provide an account of the
apparent similarity of these ﬁndings to outcomes regard-
ing the ‘basal temporal language area’ (reviewed above).
Nonetheless, it remains possible that differences in spe-
ciﬁc–exemplar vs. abstract–category processing for
strictlyvisual–structureinformationarealsopresent,but
in a region other than the fusiform region that here
showed an object–typehemisphere interaction, or that
the regions found in the word-stem completion and
object priming studies are not identical. It is also possible
that the fusiform region that we here observed to be
differentially affected by repeated–same compared with
repeated–different object exemplars subserves, or is part
of, an abstract visual word form system rather than an
abstract visual object form system. (Marsolek’s distinc-
tion of abstract–category vs. speciﬁc–exemplar based
processing also allows for this possibility, proposing that
the left cerebral hemisphere implements, at least in part,
asubsystemthatrecognizesabstractcategoriesofvarious
kinds of visual forms, including word forms as well as
othershapes.)Anabstractvisualwordformsystemcould
then reasonably contribute to all of the tasks in which
modulation of this region has been observed: (i) encoding
ofvisuallypresentedwords(withgreateractivationofthe
abstract visual word form associated with later remem-
bering rather than forgetting, [66]), (ii) encoding and
generation of completions in the auditory word-stem
completiontask(recodingthewordintoanabstractword
form or into a subword component to allow the covert
generation of a completion, or possibly as a consequence
of such generation, [10]), and (iii) in the current task —
recoding of the pictures into names or into a conceptual:
phonological form, either with conscious awareness orW. Koutstaal et al. : Neuropsychologia 39 (2001) 184–199 197
without such awareness, but with such recoding not
always identical across the exemplars of a pair.
To begin to resolve these issues, future experiments
could examine the effects of perceptual similarity manip-
ulations under conditions where the objects are non-rep-
resentational abstract forms, without any pre-existing
lexical or semantic associations, or where the visual
forms are manipulated to repeat relatively more ‘ab-
stract’ levels of visual form (e.g. a lollipop and a
magnifying glass may share similar overall shape, cf.
[27]) but where the lexical and semantic information
associated with those similar abstract forms clearly
differs. On an abstract visual object-form account, such
similarly-shaped but differently-named items might re-
sult in priming-related reductions in neural activity
across objects of similar shape (particularly in left
fusiform cortex). By contrast, on the basis of an account
emphasizing abstract lexical, phonological, or concep-
tual codes involved in naming or otherwise tagging
stimuli, this condition should not yield evidence of
priming because the names associated with the similar
shapes are different. (An abstract visual word-form
account would yield predictions similar to this second
alternative.) Yet a further possibility might be to exam-
ine the consequences of providing or not providing the
object’s name prior to the presentation of the objects: if
the residual differences that we observed in left fusiform
gyrus for same vs. different exemplars arose because —
at least in some instances — different ‘lexical tags’ were
evoked by the two exemplars, then ensuring that the
same ‘tag’ is evoked (by providing it) should reduce, and
possibly eliminate, the effect of exemplar type (same vs.
different) in left fusiform; however, if the difference was
primarily driven by visual object–form differences, then
provision of the common (shared) name should have
little effect and a difference in the magnitude of priming
for same vs. different exemplars (same\different) in left
fusiform gyrus should still be found.
Finally, some possible questions regarding the gener-
alizability of the present ﬁndings — beyond the speciﬁc
task conditions that were used in this study — should
be noted. First, the encoding task that we used, involving
comparative size judgments of objects, comprises a
relatively higher order visual-semantic task and an at-
tribute that is inferred, rather than directly present, in
the objects [cf. [26]]. The extent to which a similar
pattern of perceptual speciﬁcity might be obtained for
other, possibly lower level or directly presented percep-
tual or sensory attributes, or for abstract attributes with
no explicit perceptual component (e.g. monetary value),
is not known.
Second, the precise nature of the perceptual changes
for the same and different exemplars that might be
sufﬁcient to observe modulation of the ‘neural priming’
effect cannot, of course, be determined from this study
where — in order to maximize our initial likelihood of
ﬁnding both neural and behavioral differences for same
and different exemplars — multiple aspects of the
stimuli (as for the different exemplars of everyday
objects) were varied, including shape, color, surface
pattern, material, and (to a lesser extent) orientation.
Behavioral studies of perceptual speciﬁcity effects in
repetition priming suggest that some of these factors are
likely to be more inﬂuential in determining behavioral
differences than others. For example, using a picture
naming task, Cave et al. [12] found no effects of
manipulations of color or texture on naming latency
(even though these changes could be detected at above-
chance levels, they did not detrimentally affect naming
response times). Nonetheless, several aspects made the
different exemplars of the present study perceptually
different, and thus may have contributed to the behav-
ioral and neural patterns observed.
Third, there are questions concerning the possible
mediating role of attention to the perceptual form
changes and the relative saliency and task-relevance of
those changes. Insofar as, in the present study, item
exemplar pairs were selected such that they yielded the
same ‘answer’ for both of the exemplars within a pair,
and same:different exemplar status was not relevant to
the size judgment task that participants were asked to
perform, it is possible that the emergence of neural
perceptual speciﬁcity effects does not depend on partic-
ipants’ explicit attentional focus on the varying percep-
tual nature of the exemplars. However, it is also quite
possible that the speciﬁc task conditions that we em-
ployed, such as the number of initial repetitions of the
items, or the repeated study–test cycle format, acted to
especially enhance ‘item-speciﬁc’ perceptual information
for the presented items and:or to increase participants’
awareness of the altered perceptual form of the different
exemplars — perhaps encouraging participants to adopt
something akin to a ‘stimulus discrimination’ approach.
The extent to which these factors may modulate the
magnitude or the pattern of neural priming effects in
relation to perceptual speciﬁcity is not known [compare,
for example, [13,49,57]]. Efforts to examine these ques-
tions are likely to continue to yield insights into the ways
that we beneﬁt from prior encounters with objects, the
brain regions that support such learning, and the nature
of perceptual speciﬁcity effects in object processing.
They might also illuminate the more difﬁcult to deﬁne
complementary pole of visual speciﬁcity, denoted by the
term ‘abstract visual form’, whereby — despite consid-
erable variations in perceptual appearances — we may
still judge that ‘a cup, is a cup, is a cup’.
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